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Notes
Can a Change in Decision-Making Authority
Be a Change With Respect to Voting?
Presley v. Etowah County Commission
and

Mack v. Russell County Commission'
I. INTRODUCTION

The Voting Rights Act of 19652 triggered profound changes in southern
politics, providing the impetus for a revolution in minority voting rights.
Despite the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment3 almost a hundred years
before, African-Americans in most southern states could not effectively
exercise the right to vote.4 Congress acted in response to this "long and sorry
history"5 by passing the Voting Rights Act. Section 5,6 a key provision of
the Act, targets particular southern states for federal scrutiny of their electoral
practices.7 Section 5 requires these jurisdictions to obtain judicial or
administrative preclearance before enforcing any new "voting qualification or

1. 112 S. Ct. 820 (1992).
2. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 19731973bb-1 (1988)).
The most important provisions of the Voting Rights Act are Sections 2, 4, and 5. Section
2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988), establishes that a violation of the right of any citizen to vote occurs
if "it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the state or
political subdivision are not equally open to participation" by members of a protected class of
citizens. Section 4, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(c) (1988), defines the "tests or devices" which are
prohibited electoral procedures. For § 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1982), see infra note 7 and
accompanying text.
3. The Fifteenth Amendment states that "[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged ... on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."
U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
4. See generally VALDIMER 0. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION

(1950).
5. City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 379 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988).
7. Section 4(b) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1988), sets forth the coverage formula
for § 5. The original states covered by § 5 in 1965 were Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana,
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina and Virginia. At present, Alaska, Arizona, Texas,
and localities within California, Florida, Michigan, New Hampshire, New York, and South
Dakota are also covered by § 5. Laughlin McDonald, The Quiet Revolution in Minority Voting
Rights, 42 VAND. L. Rv. 1249, 1255 n.24 (1989).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1992

1

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 4 [1992], Art. 6
1322

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

prerequisite
to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to
8
voting."

The Supreme Court recently decided two consolidated cases involving the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Presley v. Etowah County Commission and Mack
v. Russell County Commission.9 These cases illuminate the controversy that
surrounds the interpretation of the Voting Rights Act. Few commentators and
critics dispute the impressive early achievements of the Voting Rights Act and
its important role in the civil rights movement, but there is a great deal of
disagreement among scholars as to exactly what Section 5 was intended to
protect and what kinds of electoral practices come within its scope.
Conservatives assert that judicial decisions and administrative authorities have
impermissibly reshaped the original Act. 0 They endorse the extraordinary
measures taken by the federal government in 1965 to provide access to the
ballot, but they argue that the courts, Congress, and the Justice Department
have shifted to more slippery terrain by extending the scope of Section 5 to
such changes in public voting as annexations and redistricting." Civil rights
activists, on the other hand, often feel frustrated by the "foot-dragging" of
administrative authorities as well as by inconsistent and narrowing constructions employed by the federal judiciary in voting rights cases.' 2 Some
political observers in the middle focus on the interactions among the varied
players involved with voting rights (civil rights activists, local and federal
government officials, federal judges, and attorneys in the Civil Rights Division
of the Justice Department). Interactions among these players often result in
a "compromised compliance" that provides functional, if not ideal solutions to
problems with the Voting Rights legislation. 4
In Presley,the Court considered whether seemingly routine administrative
decisions that resulted in a dilution of the authority and powers of elected
officials were subject to Section 5 scrutiny. 5 This Note explores the recent
opinion in light of the background of Section 5, the types of cases to which
it has been applied, and the interactions among the different players in the
voting rights arena. Part II of this Note gives the facts and holding of the
instant decision; Part III(A) provides a background and description of key
provisions of Section 5; Part III(B) traces the main categories of cases to

8. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988).
9. 112 S. Ct. 820 (1992).
10. See ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES CouNT (1987), for a detailed analysis

of the Voting Rights Act from a conservative perspective.
11. Id. at 137-57.
12. See, e.g., Lani Guinier, Keeping the Faith: Black Voters in the Post-ReaganEra, 24
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 412 (1989).
13. See generallyHOwARD BALL ET AL.,

COMPROMISED COMPLIANCE: IMPLEMENTATION

OF THE 1965 VOTING RIGHTS ACT (1982).

14. Id. at 13-29, 193-208. "Examining the impact of the Voting Rights Act on the South
since 1965, we believe that 'compromised compliance,' while not good enough, has moved the
affected groups-blacks, other minorities, and whites-along the road to an open society." Id.
at 207.
15. Presley, 112 S.Ct. at 824-32.
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which Section 5 has been applied; Part III(C) describes the controversy among
the commentators; and Part IV considers the Presley and Mack cases in light
of this controversy. This Note argues that the Court pays insufficient attention
to the history and development of voting rights legislation. Implementation
of the Voting Rights Act has been most successful when the statute has been
adapted to respond to new and unanticipated situations. 6 In an increasingly
complex racial environment, courts and administrative authorities must have
the flexibility to respond to discrimination in its many guises.
II. FACTS
A. Presley v. Etowah County Commission
On August 25, 1987, the Etowah County Commission of Alabama passed
the Road Supervision Resolution and the Common Fund Resolution. 7 These
resolutions were passed soon after the election of two new county commissioners, one of whom, Lawrence Presley, was the first African-American
commissioner in Etowah County in "recent history." 8 The Road Supervision
Resolution allowed each "holdover" commissioner to retain control of his road
shop, with full responsibilities over workers and operations in his individual
road district. 9 At the same time, the resolution, by making the holdover
commissioners responsible for all roads in Etowah County, gave them joint
responsibility for the repair, maintenance, and improvement of roads in the
districts represented by the new commissioners.20 Commissioner Presley and
Commissioner Williams2 ' were to oversee maintenance of the county
courthouse and the engineering department but were given little scope for
exercising authority over roads in their districts. The two new commissioners
voted against the resolution, but the resolution was passed by a 4-2 margin.22
The Common Fund Resolution stipulated that "all monies earmarked and
budgeted for repair, maintenance and improvement of the streets, roads and

16. Justice Stevens, in his opinion in Presley, urges this viewpoint. He refers to the

observation of one Congressman:
When I voted for the Voting Rights Act of 1965, I hoped that 5 years would be
ample time. But resistance to progress has been more subtle and more effective than
I thought possible. A whole arsenal of racist weapons has been perfected. Boundary
lines have been gerrymandered, elections have been switched to an at-large basis,
counties have been consolidated, elective offices have been abolished where blacks
had a chance of winning ....
Id. at 837 (citing Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 389 n.8 (1971)).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 832.
19. Id. at 825.
20. Id.
21. Commissioners Presley and Williams were the two new commissioners elected pursuant
to a 1986 consent decree. Commissioner Williams was white, while Commissioner Presley was
African-American. Id.
22. Id.
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public ways of Etowah County [shall] be placed and maintained in common
accounts."'
Prior to the resolution, each individual commissioner had
discretion in spending funds in his own district.24 Presley challenged the
county's adoption of these resolutions in federal court, arguing that these
resolutions violated Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act because the county had
not sought administrative or judicial preclearance in accordance with that
statute.'B. Russell County Commission v. Mack
In May 1979, the Russell County Commission of Alabama moved to
adopt a "unit system" for its road works: Whereas in the past, individual
commissioners had been in charge of road repair and maintenance work in
their respective districts, now the county engineer was authorized to make all
decisions concerning "road construction, maintenance, personnel, and
inventory."26 The county adopted this resolution, allegedly because one
commissioner had been indicted on charges of corruption. 7 The county
subsequently petitioned the state legislature to pass legislation and the
legislature complied.28 In May 1986, following the redrawing of district
lines in Russell County, two new African-American commissioners, Ed Peter
Mack and Nathaniel Gosha, were elected to the Russell County Commission,
and they brought a Section 5 challenge against the county.29
C. ElectoralBackdrop: Consent Decrees
The actions of the county commissions in both Etowah County and
Russell County must be understood in the context of electoral changes in
Alabama. Presley was elected to the county commission following important
litigation in which African-American voters brought successful challenges to
electoral procedures used by nine counties in Alabama.3" This litigation in
Dillard v. Crenshaw Coun&' led to a consent decree, and Presley was
elected pursuant to changes conforming to this consent decree.32 Similar

23. Id.
24. Id. at 826.
25. Id. at 827.
26. Id. at 826.
27. Id.
28. Id. The Alabama Legislature passed implementing legislation in July 1979. 1979 Ala.
Acts 1132.
29. Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 827.
30. Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 649 F. Supp. 289 (M.D. Ala. 1986).
31. 649 F. Supp. 289 (M.D. Ala. 1986). A federal district court granted injunctive relief
declaring that the state legislature was "racially inspired" in its adoption of at-large elections.
The plaintiffs amended their complaints to add other cities and counties, and all but seven
jurisdictions entered into a consent decree agreeing to a resolution of the plaintiffs' claims.
Etowah County was one of the counties that entered into the consent decree. Id. at 292 n.4.
32. Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 825.
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litigation involving the Russell County Commission led to a 1985 consent
decree in Sumbry v. Russell County.3 Appellants Mack and Gosha were
elected as a result of changes implemented after the consent decree? 4
D. District Court Proceedingsand Supreme Court Holding
Presley and Mack both raise the question whether the county resolutions
were changes subject to the preclearance requirement of Section 5.3' The
appellants in both Presley and Mack filed a joint complaint in the Federal
District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, "alleging racial discrimination in the operation of the Etowah and Russell County Commissions in
violation of prior court orders, the Constitution, Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 ... and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act."3 6 They later
amended their complaints to add Section 5 claims. 7
A three-judge district court heard the appellants' Section 5 claims while
the other claims were still pending in the district court.38 The district court
held that changes in the responsibilities of elected officials were subject to
preclearance when they "effect[ed] a significant relative change in the powers
exercised by governmental officials elected by, or responsible to, substantially
'
According to this standard, the Road
different constituencies of voters. 39
Supervision Resolution of Etowah County was subject to preclearance, but the
Unit System and Common Fund Resolution of Russell' County were not. The
Road Supervision Resolution was a "significant" change because it involved
a transfer of authority among officials responsible to different constituencies.4"

Petitioners Presley and Mack appealed the district court rulings on their
joint complaint to the United States Supreme Court.4' They challenged the
adverse rulings with respect to the Unit System and Common Fund Resolution. The Etowah County Commission did not appeal the ruling on the Road
Supervision Resolution. The Supreme Court affirmed the rulings of the
district court. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, held that the
preclearance requirement of Section 5 did not apply to the adoption of the

33. Presley, 112 S.Ct. at 826 (citing Sumbry v. Russell County, No. 84-T-1386-E (M.D.
Ala. 1985)). The county commission was enlarged to seven members and the at-large election
system was replaced with elections on a district-by-district basis.
34. Id. at 827.
35. For a more detailed discussion of § 5, see infra notes 51-65 and accompanying text.
36. Presley, 112 S.Ct. at 827.
37. Id.
38. Id. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act provides that "[a]ny action under this section
shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges in accordance with § 2284 of title 28
and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court." 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988).
39. Presley, 112 S.Ct. at 827.
40. Id.
41. Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act provides that § 5 claims can be appealed directly
from the federal district court to the United States Supreme Court. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(5)
(1988).
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Unit System or to the Common Fund Resolution.42 Justice Kennedy adopted
a different analysis from the district court. According to him, the significant
issue was not whether these resolutions "effect[ed] a significant relative change
in the powers exercised by governmental officials elected by, or responsible
to, substantially different constituencies of voters., 43 Instead, the correct
inquiry was whether the present case fell into the categories of cases to which
Section 5 had been applied in the past. 44 He determined that it did not.45
The Unit System and the Common Fund Resolution concerned only changes
in the internal administrative operations of a county commission and such
changes in the past had not been subject to Section 5 analysis.46
Justice Kennedy was joined in his opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Souter, and Thomas. Justice Stevens wrote a
dissenting opinion in which Justices White and Blackmun joined.47
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: Background and Provisions
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was an historic measure designed to
correct a flagrant wrong. Despite the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment
almost a hundred years earlier, African-Americans in southern states had few
civil rights and were usually ineligible to vote because of stringent, raciallymotivated laws enacted by southern legislatures.48 Property qualifications,
literacy tests, comprehension tests, poll taxes, and impracticable registration
procedures were some of the many ways in which African-American voting
rights were curtailed.49 Congress concluded that case-by-case litigation was
ineffective because such litigation gave southern states plenty of time to
develop new subterfuges to resist application of the Fifteenth Amendment."
The Voting Rights Act has had dramatic results. Whereas in 1965 there
were less than one hundred African-American elected officials in southern
states originally targeted by the Voting Rights Act, by 1987 there were almost

42. Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 827-29.
43. Id. at 827.
44. Id. at 828-32.
45. Id. at 832.
46. Id. at 829-30.
47. Id. at 824.
48. See generallyKEY, supra note 4.
49. Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act was designed to eliminate these kind of tests and
devices. The phrase "test or device" is defined as
any requirement that a person as a prerequisite for voting or registration for voting
(1) demonstrate the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter, (2)
demonstrate any educational achievement or his knowledge ofany particular subject,
(3) possess good moral character, or (4) prove his qualifications by the voucher of
registered voters or members of any other class.
42 U.S.C. § 1973b(c) (1988).
50. See THERNSTROM, supra note 10, at 11-20.
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3000."' It has been estimated that the number of African-American
registered voters in the southern states originally targeted by the Voting Rights
Act rose from 994,000 in 1965 to 3.5 million in 1986.52
Section 5 is perhaps the most important provision of the Voting Rights
Act 3 It requires covered jurisdictions (originally seven southern states) to
submit any new "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting
different from that in force and effect on November 1, 1964, or ... on
November 1, 1968, or ...November 1, 1972" to the Attorney General or
to a three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia for a determination that the proposed change does not have the
"purpose or effect" of "abridging the right to vote on account of race or
color.""5 The covered jurisdiction bears the burden of proof to show that a
change does not have a discriminatory purpose or effect. 6 Because it would
be expensive and cumbersome to seek a declaratory judgment in the district
court, most jurisdictions submit proposed changes to the Attorney General.
If the Attorney General does not issue an objection letter within sixty days,
then the jurisdiction may implement the change. 7 If an objection is made,
then the political subdivision may seek a declaratory judgment in the district
court or redraft the objectionable change."8 Most submissions receive
preclearance, but the provision has teeth, and objections have prevented local
officials from implementing significant electoral changes that would have
disfavored minorities.5 9

51. McDonald, supra note 7, at 1252.

52. Id. at 1253 nn.13-14.
53. See, e.g., BALL ET AL., supra note 13, at 17-18.
The inclusion of § 5 in the Voting Rights Act was based on two basic assumptions:
First, local jurisdictions bent on preventing blacks from voting can be, and in the

past have been, rather ingenious in devising new tests and devices to replace old
ones that have been declared illegal; second, the limited resources of the Department
of Justice make it nearly impossible to investigate independently, on the

Department's own initiative, changes with respect to voting enacted by states and
local jurisdictions covered by the Act.

Id. at 17.
54. The Voting Rights Act initially went into effect for five years. The Act was extended
for a further five years in 1970, 1975, and again in 1982. See infra note 64 and accompanying
text.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988).
56. Section 5 states:
Such State or subdivision may institute an action in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification,
prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not
have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or
color....
Id.
57. Id.
58. See Hiroshi Motomura, PreclearanceUnder Section Five of the Voting Rights Act, 61
N.C. L. REv. 189, 191 n.15 (1983).
59. See in'fra part HIL.
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The Voting Rights Act was initially passed for a five-year period.6" But
in 1970, 1975, and again in 1982, Congress renewed the Act, strengthening
and extending its provisions.6' The Voting Rihts Act for now seems a
permanent fixture in the "legislative firmament."'
B. The JudicialDecisions
The federal courts have played an active and important role in shaping
the Voting Rights Act. Federal judges have not confined themselves to
implementation of voting rights policy. They have also helped to shape and
influence the Act and Congressional amendments to it.63 There are six
general categories of Section 5 cases that have come before the courts.'
They involve (1) changes with respect to access to the ballot, such as changes
in registration requirements, polling, and precinct changes; (2) changes in the
qualifications of candidates and candidacy requirements; (3) changes from
single districts to at-large multimember districts; (4) annexations; (5)
redistricting changes; and (6) the creation and abolition of elective office. A
further category of changes involves transfers of authority among elected
officials. There is little case law for this category, but jurisdictions have
sought preclearance from the Justice Department for such transfers of
authority.6 5
A key judicial ruling in 1969, Allen v. State Board of Elections,66
anticipated the issues raised in many of these categories.6' In Allen, which
was actually a consolidation of four cases, the Court considered the scope of
the preclearance requirement.68 The most important of the consolidated
cases, Fairleyv. Patterson,69 involved a proposed change from single-district
voting to at-large voting. 0 Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority,
held the change fell within the scope of the Act.7 ' His opinion charted
important new territory: "The Voting Rights Act was aimed at the subtle, as

60. Pub. L. No. 89-110, tit. 1, § 2, 79 Stat. 445 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1988)).
61. See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(c)(3) (1988); Voting
Rights Act Amendments of 1982, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(8) (1988).
62. THERNSTROM, supra note 10, at 31.
63. See generallyBALL Er AL., supranote13; NANcY MAVEETY, REPRESENTATION RiGHTS
AND THE BURGER YEARS (1991); THERNSTROM, supra note 10.
64. See infra notes 80-139 and accompanying text; see also Presley, 112 S.Ct. at 827-29
for a discussion of some of these categories.
65. In Presley, the brief submitted by the Solicitor General sets out instances where the
Department of Justice objected to transfers of authority. Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 833 n.3.
66. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
67. Id. at 550-54.
68. Id. at 550. The court considered the States' new laws or regulations and found that,
'The central issue is whether these provisions fall within the prohibition of § 5
....
Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 565-66.
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well as the obvious, state regulations which have the effect of denying citizens
their right to vote because of race."7 2 He argued that the "right to vote can
be affected by a dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute prohibition
on casting a ballot."'73
In his dissent, Justice Harlan made objections that would be taken up by
the dissent in many Section 5 cases.74 For Justice Harlan, Section 5 could
not be torn from its moorings in Section 4, which dealt with the elimination
7
of literacy tests, comprehension tests, and poll taxes. " Preclearance was
... to assure the
but
policies
substantive
designed not "to implement new
effectiveness of the dramatic step that Congress had taken in Section 4."76
Allen set the stage for later Section 5 cases. As racial dynamics became
77
more complex, the forms of discrimination grew more sophisticated. Thus
the later
ballot,
individual
the
with
while the early cases involved interference
group
one
by
voting
bloc
dilution"-where
"vote
with
more
dealt
have
cases
8
is manipulated to dilute the voting strength of another group.
Some of the important cases in each of the categories described above
will be briefly discussed.79 The aim is chiefly to describe the kinds of
changes that have been found to be changes with respect to voting. Some
cases falling within these categories are briefly described to give a flavor of
the kind of controversies that have surrounded important Section 5 litigation.
1. Access to the Ballot
Changes in registration and changes in polling and precinct places do not
involve the complex analysis characteristic of vote dilution cases. However,
such changes are highly important. As one commentator noted, "[p]olitical
participation assumes the individual vote; unless the vote is cast, it is pointless

72. Id. at 565.
73. Id. at 569.
74. There are echoes of these arguments in the majority opinion in Presley, 112 S. Ct. at
832. The opinion states, "The Voting Rights Act is not an all-purpose antidiscrimination statue.
The fact that the intrusive mechanisms of the Act do not apply to other forms of pernicious
discrimination does not undermine its utility in combating the specific evils it was designed to
address." Id.
75. See supra note 52.
76. Allen, 393 U.S. at 584 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
77. See, e.g., Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 837 n.20 (citing S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
10 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177,187).
Following the dramatic rise in registration, a broad array of dilution schemes
were employed to cancel the impact of the new black vote. Elective posts were
made appointive; election boundaries were gerrymandered; majority runoffs were
instituted to prevent victories under a prior plurality system... The ingenuity of
such schemes seems endless.... Their common purpose and effect has been to
offset the gains made at the ballot box under the Act.
Id.
78. McDonald, supra note 7, at 1256.
79. See infra notes 80-141 and accompanying text.
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to consider more complex questions . . . ." Allen itself concerned a change
in the procedures for the casting of write-in ballots.8 ' In Perkins v.
Matthews, 2 a 1971 case, the United States Supreme Court held that Section
5 covered changes in the location of polling places. 3 Legislatures, counties,
and cities could not locate polling places in inconvenient or intimidating
places to discourage minorities from voting."4
Changes in registration procedures obviously affect the individual ballot
and covered jurisdictions have been required to show that changes in
registration do not have a disparate impact on African-Americans." For
example, registration procedures which require "proper" identification or
reregistration methods8 that serve to undermine costly registration campaigns
will be closely scrutinized. 7
2. Candidacy Requirements
Some of the Section 5 cases have dealt with cases where qualifications
of candidates or candidacy requirements have been changed. In Dougherty
County Board of Education v. White, 8 a county instituted a new rule
requiring board of education members to take unpaid leaves of absence while
campaigning for office. 9 The United States Supreme Court held that the
rule operated like a filing fee and imposed "substantial economic
disincentives" on employees running for public office." Because of its
potential for discrimination, the rule was subject to Section 5 preclearance. 9'
In NAACP v. Hampton County Election Commission,' two civil rights
organizations and some residents of Hampton County sought to enjoin an
election scheduled to be held four months after the date approved by the
Attorney General. 3 The Court ruled that these changes could not be simply
characterized as "ministerial" and may have acted to discourage latecomers
from entering the race. 4

80. Motomura, supra note 58, at 198.

81. Allen, 393 U.S. at 552.
82. 400 U.S. 379 (1971).
83. Id. at 388.
84. Id..
85. See, e.g., Motomura, supranote 58, at 198-201.
86. Id. at 199 n.63. Jurisdictions may require burdensome proofs ofidentity for registration,
or find pretexts to purge voter lists, thus necessitating less effective reregistration campaigns.
Such practices will be closely scrutinzed under Section 5.
87. Id. at 199 n.57 (citing the Attorney General's Objection letter to Jasper County, Miss.
(June 8, 1971)).
88. 439 U.S. 32 (1978).
89. Id. at 34.
90. Id. at 40.
91. Id. af 43, 47.
92. 470 U.S. 166 (1985).
93. Id. at 170, 173.
94. Id. at 175, 178. See alsoHadnott v. Amos, 394 U.S. 358 (1969) (dealing with a change
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The next three categories of cases to be considered deal with "vote
dilution."9' Some of the more complex and interesting Section 5 cases deal
with vote dilution where access is not restricted to the ballot but votes are
made less "meaningful" using a variety of tactics.' One authority describes
vote dilution as "'a process whereby election laws or practices, either singly
or in concert, combine with systematic bloc voting among an identifiable
Vote
group to diminish the voting strength of at least one other group'.
dilution cases have come up in a variety of contexts, including "reapportionment plans that unnecessarily fragment or concentrate black population,
numbered posts, staggered terms, majority vote requirements, and discriminatory annexations."

3. At-large Voting
Changes from single-member to at-large voting, or multimember
districting, may often result in vote dilution. It has been observed that
[a] minority population often has enough voting strength as a group to elect
one or more members of a city or county governing body in elections that
are conducted by single-member districts. If the election is at-large,
however, all seats are elected from throughout the jurisdiction, and in99many
cases white majorities have maintained total or nearly total control.
° which involved the election of local commissionIn Fairleyv. Patterson,'"
ers, the Supreme Court held that the preclearance requirement applied to a
Similarly, in Perkins v.
change from district to at-large voting."'
Matthews, °2 the Court held that Section 5 required preclearance of a change
from ward to at-large election of aldermen.0 3

in a filing deadline).
95. See infra notes 101-139 and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462 (1987); City of Port
Arthur v. United States, 459 U.S. 159 (1982); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156
(1980).
97. McDonald, supranote 7, at 1256 n.26 (quoting MINoRrry VOTE DiLuTioN 4 (Chandler
Davidson ed., 1984)).
98. Id. at 1256 nn.27-31.
99. Motomura, supra note 58, at 206.
100. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
101. Motomura, supra note 58, at 206.
102. 400 U.S. 379 (1971).
103. 1d. at 394.
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4. Annexations
Annexations have fueled some important Section 5 litigation.0'°

By

"annexing" or enlarging the boundaries of a city or municipality, local

authorities may change the racial balance of the electorate. Annexations are
most controversial when the minority population and the white population are
roughly equivalent in size and the effect of netting additional white votes
through an annexation would be to destroy the "fragile victory margins that
minority candidates had enjoyed."' 5 In 1971, in Perkins v. Matthews, the
United States Supreme Court held that annexations were not exempt from
Section 5 preclearance.' 06
In City of Petersburgv. UnitedStates,'° the district court conditionally

approved a proposed annexation: the city would first have to "neutralize...
any adverse effect upon the political participation of black voters."' 8 This
requirement meant the city had to switch from at-large elections to ward
elections for council members." ° The Supreme Court affirmed this decision."' In City of Richmond v. United States,"' the Supreme Court held

that a reduction in the percentage of the minority population did not
necessarily indicate a Section 5 violation." 2 A court was to consider
whether there were sound economic and demographic factors that justified an
annexation."' It would also have to find election plans that "afford[ed]
[minorities] representation reasonably equivalent to their political strength in
the enlarged community.""' 4 In City of Pleasant Grove v. United States,"'

the Court considered a city's decision not to annex an area populated by
African-Americans while annexing a neighboring, thinly populated white
area. 6 The Court affirmed a district court ruling that such a change was
subject to Section 5 preclearance." 7

104. Important annexation cases include City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S.
462 (1987); City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975); City of Petersburg v.
United States, 410 U.S. 962 (1973); Perkins,400 U.S. 379 (1971).
105. Motomura, supra note 58, at 223.
106. Perkins,400 U.S. at 388-89.
107. 354 F. Supp. 1021 (D.D.C. 1972), affld, 410 U.S. 962 (1973).
108. Id. at 1031.
109. Id.
110. 410 U.S. 962 (1973).
111. 422 U.S. 358 (1975).
112. Id. at 371.
113. Id. at 375.
114. Id. at 370.
115. 479 U.S. 462 (1987).
116. Id. at 464-68.
117. Id. at 472.
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5. Redistricting

Whereas annexations enlarge the boundary lines of a municipality,
redistricting redraws voting districts within a locality. Redistricting plans may
be suspect when they contain overpopulated minority districts, causing the
minority voters in these districts to be poorly represented."' The Supreme
Court decisions in redistricting cases have been criticized as inconsistent with
its decisions in annexation cases." 9 In annexation cases, the Court has
considered the totality of circumstances and has weighed such factors as
"racially polarized voting, a persistent history of racial discrimination in civil
rights, and chronic failure of minority candidates to win elections."'20 The
Supreme Court has adopted a different approach in its redistricting cases,
however. In Beer v. United States,' a case involving the redistricting of
the New Orleans City Council, the Court instituted a "retrogression" test.12
Under this test, a change would only be considered to have a discriminatory
Thus,
effect if minorities were worse off after a change than before it."
even if the balance between minority population and its representation
remained unfavorable, voting discrimination would not be held to exist so long
as the change was not "regressive."' 24 Beer and a subsequent decision,
2
Lockhart 2v.
6 United States," have both been sharply criticized by civil rights

activists.

6. Creation or Abolition of Elective Office
Another line of cases involves the replacement of elected officials by
appointed ones. In Hardy v. Wallace,27 African-American citizens brought
a class action challenging an Alabama statute which permitted the governor
to appoint members of a county racing commission.128 Previously, the
legislative delegation representing the county had chosen the members of the

118. See Motomura, supra note 58, at 233.
119. See, e.g., Amy Snyder Weed, Note, Getting Around the Voting Rights Act: The
Supreme CourtSets the Limits ofRacialDiscriminationin the South, 10 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J.

381 (1990).
120. Motomura, supra note 58, at 197.
121. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
122. Id. at 139-42.
123. Id. at 141.
124. Id.
125. 460 U.S. 125 (1983).
126. One commentator has argued that the "retrogression test smacks of a logic that two
wrongs make a right: It allows abridgement of a fundamental right simply because the
abridgement created by the new law is no worse than the abridegement which previously
existed." Mark E. Haddad, Note, Getting Results Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 94
YALE L.J. 139, 161 (1984).
127. 603 F. Supp. 174 (N.D. Ala. 1985).
128. Id. at 175.
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commission.29 The United States District Court for the Northern District
of Alabama ruled that the the change clearly had a potential for discrimination
and was thus subject to Section 5.I3 In Horry County v. United States,",
the South Carolina state legislature passed a statute that provided for the
election of county council members."' They were formerly appointed by
the governor. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
held that this change was a change with respect to voting and was subject to
Section 5 preclearance.' 33 In County Council v. United States, 34 the
United States Distict Court for the District of Columbia held that a South
Carolina law which shifted authority over local affairs from the governor and
general assembly to a county council elected at large could be considered a
change with respect to voting.'35 In Robinson v. Alabama State Department
of Education,'3 6 there was a change from county-wide election of members
of the board of education to appointment of these members by the city
council.'
This change was held to be subject to Section 5
preclearance.'
7. Transfers of Authority of Elected Officials
There are few judicial decisions involving tranfers of authority among
elected officials. But the United States Attorney General has on numerous
occasions objected to transfers of authority. The Justice Department in its
brief in the instant decision offered the following examples:
(1)Mobile, Alabama, March 2, 1976, involving a transfer of administrative
duties from the entire commission to individual commissioners; (2)
Charleston, South Carolina, June 14, 1977, involving a transfer of taxing
authority from the legislative delegation to the county council; . .. (5)
Brunswick and Blynn County, Georgia, August 16, 1982, involving the
abolition of separate city and county commissions and the transfer of their
powers to a consolidated commission; (6) Hillsborough County, Florida,
August 29, 1984, involving a transfer ofpower over municipalities from the
legislative delegation to the county commission ... (7)Waycross, Georgia,
February 16, 1988, involving a change in the duties of the mayor; and (8)
San Patricio, Texas, May 7, 1990, involving a transfer of39
voter registration
duties from the county clerk to the county tax assessor.
1

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
Id. at 179.
449 F. Supp. 990 (D.D.C. 1978).
Id. at 994.
Id. at 996.
555 F. Supp. 694 (D.D.C. 1983).
Id. at 702.
652 F. Supp. 484 (M.D. Ala. 1987).
Id. at 485.
Id. at 486.
Id.
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C. The Controversy Among the Commentators
Some recurrent controversies center around the Voting Rights Act. Many
conservatives will concede that the passage of the Voting Rights Act was
timely and necessary in the face of the long resistance to the Fifteenth
Amendment. 4 They are unhappy, however, about the expansive scope
federal courts have given to the Act.'4 ' Some themes that persist in the
debate between conservatives and liberals are as follows.
1. Federalism
Conservatives argue that the key provisions of the Voting Rights Act
were intended to be temporary and that the Act gained its permanent character
because administrative authorities and federal courts reshaped and altered the
original Act. 142 Congress extended and amended the Act without sufficiently considering the extraordinary implications of continued federal interference
in local affairs. 43 Southern electoral tactics needed scrutiny when access to
the ballot was denied, but African-Americans can now freely exercise the right
to vote. 44 Conservatives charge that too often the judiciary and federal
administrative authorities run roughshod over important policy objectives of
local authorities in their efforts to implement Section 5.145 Thus, sound
economic motives may prompt annexations, they argue, but these motives are
ignored if they have the incidental effect of altering minority voting strength.
A related charge is that lawyers in the Voting Section of the Justice Department play on stereotypes of a racist South when in fact the racial landscape
has changed a great deal."4
Liberals argue that the broad language of the Voting Rights Act shows
that it was intended to be open-ended. The Act has to be fine-tuned to meet
the challenges of new and varied strains of discrimination. 47 Liberals
defend the necessity for federal scrutiny: to suggest that electoral politics in
the South no longer needs policing is to have much too optimistic a view of
the problems of racism. 14 The sway of a David Duke Min Louisiana
shows that gains made by minorities are fragile. It is important to keep the

140. See, e.g., Katharine Inglis Butler, Reapportionment,The Courts,and The VotingRights
Act: A Resegregation of the PoliticalProcess,56 U. COLO. L. REv. 1, 69 (1984).
141. See, e.g., THERNSTROM, supra note 10, at 29-30, 137-56.
142. Id. at 29-32.
143. Id. at 235, 237.
144. Id. at 235 ("Public policy on voting rights has slipped across important lines. Distrust
of the South was appropriate in 1965, but the 'emergency' provisions have now been extended
beyond the year 2000, with little prospect that any jurisdiction will be able to bail out.").
145. Id. at 140; Butler, supra note 140, at 69.
146. THERNSTROM, supra note 10, at 163-69.
147. Guinier, supra note 12, at 412-13.
148. Id. at 423.
149. David Duke is a former Ku Klux Klan leader who ran for governor in Lousiana in
1991. He was defeated, but the strength of his support in the primary caused much alarm.
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channels for political participation open for minorities at a time when raciallyloaded appeals to the electorate have proved effective.'"0
2. "Affirmative Action"
Some critics are concerned about the way in which affirmative action has
been introduced into the voting rights arena.'' They object strongly to the
notion that minorities are "entitled" to representatives in proportion to their
population and argue that special protection of racial groups is inappropriate
in an electoral setting. Representatives should represent all citizens, not
"The myth of moral simplicity," writes Abigail
interest groups.' 2
Themstrom, "has largely insulated the voting rights issue from debate, yet
perhaps no other affirmative action question is more significant."'5
Liberals argue that if the Fifteenth Amendment is to be more than empty
rhetoric, then courts must confront the multitude of ways in which voting
rights can be diluted.5 4 If political power is a vital good, then there has to
be an uncompromising commitment on the part of civil rights activists to
ensure that minorities share in the exercise of this political power,' and
courts must come up with creative solutions to discourage racial vote
dilution.'5 6
3. The Role of the Courts and the Justice Department
Critics at both ends of the spectrum disagree about the effectiveness of
the federal courts and the Justice Department in implementing voting rights
policy. Conservatives argue that the original Act was amended by judicial and
administrative interpretation and then Congress inattentively put a stamp of
approval on these interpretations.5 7 According to this view, the judicial
decisions highlight the Court's inability to deal with complex constitutional
issues and its refusal to confront the basic question of what it means to
exercise the right to vote.' They charge that the lawyers in the Civil Rights
Division respond eagerly to pressures from civil rights groups and crowd out

150. Jesse Helms' successful 1990 Senate race in North Carolina against Harvey Gantt
provides an example of this.
151. See, e.g., James F. Blumstein, DefiningandProvingRaceDiscrimination: Perspectives
on the Purpose vs. Results Approach from the Voting Rights Act, 69 VA. L. REv. 633, 650
(1983).
152. Id. at 663 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964)).
153. See TEmRPSTROM, supra note 10, at 6.
154. Guinier, supranote 12, at 412-13.
155. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlam, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic
Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173 (1989).
156. Id. at 248.
157. See, e.g., THERNSTROM, supra note 10, at 235.
158. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 140, at 96-97.
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crowd out other important policy considerations in their haste to find
discriminatory intent in local political arenas." 9
Opponents argue that lawyers in the Justice Department have been too
willing to seek compromises with local jurisdictions in implementing the
Voting Rights Act. They acknowledge the difficulty facing agency officials:
"If the DOJ [Department of Justice] vigorously enforced both the spirit and
the letter of Section 5, there would surely be evasion, avoidance, and delay by
...white powerholders." 60 Liberals urge agency officials, nevertheless, to
move beyond a "shared enforcement philosophy.""'6 Congress laid down
broad guidelines and fully expected that the Justice Department and the courts
would adapt the Voting Rights Act as a flexible tool to respond to new
transmutations of an old phenomenon, namely racial prejudice.
IV. TIE INSTANT DECISION
Some of the currents of this debate are reflected in the instant decision.
While the majority in Presley and Mack acknowledged that the Voting Rights
Act was intended to have a broad and expansive scope, it nevertheless
interpreted "change with respect to voting" narrowly. 6, In Presley, the
controversy revolved around the Common Fund Resolution. 1"' At issue was
the transfer of authority over road funds of individual districts from individual
commissioners to the county commission as a whole. 65 The transfer of
authority occurred less than nine months after an African-American commissioner was elected for the first time. 66 In Mack, the appellant challenged
the county's adoption of a "unit system."' 67 The commission abolished
individual road districts and delegated control for all road operations to the
county engineer.' 68 Were both these changes subject to the preclearance
requirement?
A. Majority Opinion
Justice Kennedy, in the majority opinion, advanced several reasons for
rejecting the claim that these changes needed preclearance. 169 Allen and
later opinions established that "[t]he Voting Rights Act was aimed at the

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

THERNSTROM, supra note 10, at 163.
BALL ET AL., supra note 13, at 196.
Guinier, supra note 12, at 412.
Id. at 412-13.
Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 827-32.
Id. at 826.
Id. at 825-26.
Id. at 838.
Id. at 827.
Id. at 826.
Id. at 824-32.
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subtle, as well as the obvious,
7 state regulations that ha[d] the effect of denying
citizens the right to vote."' 1
Nevertheless, the present changes did not fall into the category of changes
7
to which the preclearance requirement had previously been applied,1 1
because these changes were not directly connected to voting. Justice Kennedy
listed four categories of cases to which Section 5 had been applied: 1) changes
that affected the manner of voting; 2) changes in candidate qualifications and
candidacy requirements; 3) changes involving the racial make-up of the
electorate (such changes as at-large elections, annexations, and
7 redistrictings);
4) changes from elective to appointive office, or vice versa. 1
To accept the resolutions as changes with respect to voting would be to
"work an unconstrained expansion" of Section 5. Justice Kennedy argued
that neither the appellants nor the United States (which submitted an amicus
curiae brief) "provide[d] a[ny] workable standards" for "distinguishing
between changes in rules governing voting174and changes in the routine
organization and functioning of government."'
The Court dismissed the Attorney General's suggestion that a distinction
could be made between budgetary changes and other changes and that
budgetary decisions need not be scrutinized under Section V 71 Justice
Kennedy pointed out that budgetary decisions could affect a shift of
power-"'a vote for an ill-funded official is less valuable than a vote for a
well-funded one"-but it was inappropriate to bring Section 5 analysis to such
changes. 76 The Court stated, "The all but limitless minor changes in the
allocation of power among officials and the constant adjustments required for
the efficient governance of every covered State illustrate the necessity for us
As for the Russell County Commisto formulate workable rules.... "'
sion, Justice Kennedy challenged the view that the delegation of authority to
the engineer was analogous to replacing an elected official with an appointed
one. 178 This argument was without merit, according to Justice Kennedy,
because what was involved in prior cases was a change from elected to
appointed office, not a relative shift in power among different governmental
officials. 179 Even though each commissioner exercised less direct authority
over road operations as a result of the unit system, the engineer (to whom the
authority was delegated) was still responsible to the county commission.' 0
The commission had the power to dismiss him.

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.

827 (citing Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 565 (1969)).
829.
828.
829.
829-30.
829.
830.
830-31.
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Justice Kennedy then went on to examine the district court's analysis in
Presley and Mack. According to the district court, if the Unit System and
Common Fund Resolution had involved inter-constituency transfers of
authority, then there would have been a change with respect to voting.'
Justice Kennedy rejected this reasoning because it began "from the faulty
premise that reallocations of authority within government [could] constitute
voting changes."' 2
Justice Kennedy directed his final salvo at the argument, made by the
appellants and the United States, that the Court should defer to the administrative construction of the provision.'83 In Chevron v. Natural Resources
Defense Council,'84 the Court held that the judiciary owed deference to the
administrative interpretation of a statute if the interpretation was reasonable.'
Justice Kennedy found the contention that a transfer of authority
was a change with respect to voting without merit. There was no ambiguity
in the statute as to whether Section 5 extended to changes other than "changes
in rules governing voting.' 8 6 It did not. Therefore, no deference could be
accorded to the Justice Department. 7
B. Dissent
Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, urged the majority to consider the
Voting Rights Act in its historical context. According to Justice Stevens,
"[t]his is a case in which a few pages of history are far more illuminating than
volumes of logic and hours of speculation about hypothetical line-drawing
problems."'88 He argued that if the Court truly accepted the expansive nature
of Section 5, then it would understand that the provision was intended to be
adapted to changing conditions. 9 Allen made clear that "voting" was to be
defined as "all action necessary to make a vote effective." 9° Neither Allen
nor later decisions had defined exhaustive categories of changes and Section
5 was intended to be flexible.' 9'
Justice Stevens rejected the argument that there were no workable
He pointed out that there had been several instances where the
standards.
Attorney General had considered such delegations of authority and raised

181. Id. at 831.
182. Id.
183. Id.
at 831-32.
184. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
185. Id. at 842-45.
186. Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 832.
187. Id. at 832. As Justice Stevens points out in the dissent, this is the first time that the
Court has disputed the Attorney General's interpretation of the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 833
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 832-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 836.
190. Id. at 835 (citing Allen v. State Bd. of Elections 393 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1969)).
191. Id. at 830.
192. Id. at 833-38.
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objections. Justice Stevens noted that "[p]rior to these cases, federal courts
had uniformly agreed with the Attorney General's interpretation that Section
5 covered transfers of decisionmaking power that had a potential for
discrimination against minority voters." IV3 He disagreed with Justice
Kennedy that the practice imposed an unfair burden on covered jurisdictions. 94
Justice Stevens then went on to give a brief overview of the kinds of
changes that had been recognized as changes relating to voting, and argued
that cases involving transfers of authority fall squarely within the scope of
Section 5.195 Such transfers of authority had the effect of making an elected
official a mere "figurehead" by "transferring his decisionmaking authority to
an appointed
96 official, or to a group of elected officials controlled by the
majority.'
Turning to the cases themselves, Justice Stevens argued that it was wrong
for the district court to divorce an analysis of the Road Supervision Resolution
from the Common Fund Resolution." According to Justice Stevens, it was
inconsistent for the district court to characterize the Road Supervision
Resolution as a change with a potential for discrimination, but not reach this
conclusion as to the Common Fund Resolution. The majority should have
focused on the totality of circumstances: The Common Fund Resolution was
passed on the same day as the Road Resolution; both resolutions were passed
soon after the election of an African-American official; and both resolutions
were passed pursuant to a consent decree.' 98 This situation should have
alerted the Court that the Common Fund Resolution was a change deserving
scrutiny.)' Justice Stevens suggested that the above circumstances provided
the "workable standards" for determining whether the change was subject to
preclearance. 2" As for the Mack case, Justice Stevens argued that the
jurisprudential history provided ample evidence for bringing this case under
the Section 5 preclearance requirement."' Together with gerrymandering
and other vote dilution cases, this case shared "the characteristic of enhancing
the power of the majority over a segment of the political community that
might otherwise be adequately represented." 2"

193. Id. at 833 nn.2-9.
194. Id. at 833.
195. Id. at 837-38.
196. Id. at 838.
197. Id. at 838-39. The Road Supervision Resolution prevented new commissioners on the
Russell County Commission from exercising authority over roads in their districts. The Common
Fund Resolution provided for all finds for the repair, maintenance, and improvement of roads
to be pooled in common accounts. This changed the prior practice of allowing each
commissioner full control of funds in his own district. Id. at 825-26.
198. Id. at 839.
199. Id. at 838-39.
200. Id. at 839.
201. Id. at 840.
202. Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol57/iss4/6

20

Ginwalla: Ginwalla: Can a Change in Decision-Making

1992]

DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITYAND VOTING RIGHTS

1341

V. COMMENT
Justice Stevens' dissent is more persuasive than Justice Kennedy's
majority opinion. This section challenges some of the arguments of the
majority and explores the implications of the Court's decision.
A. Is a Transfer ofAuthority Among' Elected Officials a Change
with Respect to Voting?
The majority concludes that it is not.20 3 It is true that in a strict
procedural sense, such a transfer does not interfere with the exercise of a right
to vote. But contrary to the majority's assertion, a transfer of authority among
elected officials does have a bearing on the substance of voting power. If an
.elected official is stripped of her capacity to represent her constitutents, then
' 204
such an action bears a "direct relation to voting and the election process. 1
In Presley,there are clear indications that the county commission intended to
dilute the authority of the newly-elected African-American commissioner: the
Common Fund Resolution was passed soon after Presley's election and on the
same day as the Road Supervision Resolution, which the district court found
to have a potential for discrimination." 5 The Common Fund Resolution
gave Presley little discretion to control the road operations of the district he
represented."
Surely, this has a bearing on the voting power of his
constituents. It is likely that the four holdover commissioners in Etowah
County passed the Road Supervision Resolution because they knew that this
measure would frustrate Presley's ability to represent his constituents in road
matters. In Mack, the Russell County Commission may have transferred
authority to the county engineer due to legitimate fears of corruption among
county commissioners."07 This action, however, could have been prompted
by the knowledge of a changing electoral landscape and the expectation that
minority commissioners would soon hold office.2 ' It is important to bring
such changes in the transfer of authority under the Section 5 preclearance
requirement because they have the potential of subverting an important aim
of the Voting Rights Act. They may block the channels of effective minority
participation in the electoral process.
In its zeal to defend the principles of federalism, the majority ignores this
aim. By arguing that the present case does not fall into the category of cases
that the Court has previously recognized for Section 5 purposes, the Court
ignores the consistent philosophy behind judicial interpretation of the Voting

203. Id. at 832.
204. Id. at 829.
205. Id. at 825.
206. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
208. Russell County was a party to litigation involving its electoral pratices. A 1972 court
order, Anthony v. Russell County, No. 961-E (M.D. Ala. 1972), ordered the commission to
expand to five members. It is conceivable that the county's 1979 resolution may have
anticipated changes in the commission, including the election of black commissioners.
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The statute is intentionally broad, and Congress fully
Rights Act.2"
expected the Court and administrative authorites to fine-tune the provisions
so as to fashion remedies to respond to new forms of discrimination. 210 The
majority treats the statute as one where some brighf line tests are selfevident.21' This viewpoint echoes Justice Harlan's dissent in Alien,32 and
the history of voting rights has shown how wrong he was. If his views had
prevailed then, much of the progress in minority voting rights would not have
been achieved. 23
B. The Searchfor "Workable Standards"
Justice Kennedy suggests that while the transfer of authority among
elected officials may bear an indirect relation to voting, it would be impractical to require preclearance for this kind of change.2 4 Delay, expense, and
bureaucratic red tape, as well as unfettered federal intrusion in local affairs,
make such a scenario highly unacceptable.
But, as the dissent points out, this
211
is hardly uncharted territory.
Some jurisdictions have submitted such
resolutions for preclearance, and courts have affirmed objections made by the
Attorney General to these transfers of authority. 216 Moreover, many
resolutions considered by local government officials are not passed overnight.
They often go through several stages of drafting, redrafting, negotiations, and
consultations with lawyers and constituents; it is hard to see how an
application for preclearance, which normally takes sixty days, imposes a
substantial added burden.3 7 There may be the rare emergency occasion
when a jurisdiction has to swiftly pass and immediately effect a resolution.
In such a case, a jurisdiction may be served by the provision in Section 5

209. As the Court noted in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334-35 (1966),
[t]he rationale of this "uncommon exercise of congressional power" which
sustained its constitutional validity was a presumption that jurisdictions which had
"resorted to the extraordinary stratagem of contriving new rules of various kinds for
the sole purpose of perpetuating voting discrimination in the face of adverse federal
court decrees" would be likely to engage in "similar maneuvers in the future in order
to evade the rememdies for voting discrimination contained in the Act itself."
210. See supra part III (discussing voting rights cases from Allen to City of Richmond v.
United States).
211. See, e.g., Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 828-32.
212. Allen v. State Bd.of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 584 (1969).
213. Presley, 112 S.Ct. at 829, 832.
214. Id. at 829.
215. Id. at 833-34 nn.2-3. Justice Stevens points out in his dissent that "there is no evidence
that the prevailing practice imposed any special burden on covered jurisdictions. For example,
in this fiscal year the Attorney General has processed over 17,000 preclearance requests, and has
approved over 99 percent of them without any undue delay." Id. at 833.
216. Id. at 833-34 nn. 2-3.
217. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act provides: "If the Attorney General has not
interposed an objection within sixty days after such submission.., the Attorney General has
affirmatively indicated that such objection will not be made." 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988).
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which provides for an expedited review "upon good cause shown., 218 It
may even be possible to carve out a very narrow alternative clearance
arrangement. If the jurisdiction can show that there was a compelling interest
for not waiting to seek preclearance and this compelling interest can survive
strict federal scrutiny, then in the rare case it may be possible to validate the
resolution after the fact. Contrary to the majority's assertion, it is possible to
be creative and to find workable standards if there is a will to do so.
C. Affirmative Action in Voting Rights?
Underlying the Court's position may be a fear that federal scrutiny will
mean that minority candidates will be "entitled" to powerful positions in an
elected body. The Court appears to be rejecting this kind of "affirmative
action" in electoral politics."' Under this view, any action that results in
incidentally diluting the power of a minority representative may be found to
be discriminatory. ' The experience with most Section 5 cases, however,'
should allay these fears. The majority of submissions made by covered
jurisdictions are approved, and when there is litigation, federal courts have
been careful, in many cases, to balance factors and employ a "fairness
standard."'" Thus courts could weigh the same kind of factors as in other
Section 5 cases to consider whether a proposed transfer of authority is
discriminatory in purpose or effect: racially polarized voting, past attempts
to obstruct minority voting rights, the level of minority involvement in
politics, and gross economic disparities between minority and white voters.'
The combined effect of these factors could be considered and weighed against
the sound economic and policy objectives that a jurisdiction may have for
particular transfers of authority.
D. Alternative Solutions to Section 5
Justice Kennedy suggests that there are more appropriate ways of dealing
with facts like those in the instant decision than by analyzing them under
Section 5.' Thus, appellants could sue under Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act" 4 or litigate violations of their constitutional rights.2 5 But this view
ignores the history of the Voting Rights Act. It was precisely the failure of
this kind of litigation on a case-by-case basis that necessitated the Voting
Rights Act. 6 Civil rights activists and politicians would not have fought

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
(Stevens,

Id.
See supra notes 151-156 and accompanying text.
See supra part IV.
See generallyWeed, supra note 123.
See Motomura, supra note 58, at 197.
Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 832.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988).
See, e.g., U.S. CoNsT. amend. XV, supra note 2.
This point is reiterated by Justice Stevens in the dissent. Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 835
J., dissenting) (citing MoCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236 (1984)).
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so vigorously to pass this very difficult piece of legislation had they not been
firmly convinced of the futility of case-by-case litigation. By 1965, federal
attorneys knew that
questions of disfranchisement should not be litigated at all; to prove the
obvious was both expensive and time-consuming and victories were too
often transient and incomplete... Unless preventive steps were taken, old
methods of disfranchisement might simply be replaced by new ones, and the
tedious and prolonged legal process would begin again.227
The preclearance requirement has an important advantage: it helps to
modify the behavior of local officials before the harm is done. 8 Federal
attorneys -familiar with particular localities can exact grudging compliance
from local officials with whom they have dealt in the past, and they can
candidly advise local officials when proposed changes are likely to meet
objections from the Justice Department. 229
E. The Purpose or Effects Clause of Section 5
Section 5 stipulates that a covered jurisdiction must show that a
"qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the
purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote
on account of race or color.""no Justice Kennedy's opinion reflects a
concern that if changes in the decision-making authority of local officials are
subjected to Section 5 scrutiny, then legitimate administrative goals of local
officials will be frustrated by the federal bureaucracy. He therefore proposes
that if such administrative decisions are discriminatory in purpose, they should
be challenged through litigation or "alternative remedial schemes" rather than
through Section 5." That this is not a very satisfactory option has already
been explored above. 2 However, there is an added dimension that Justice
Kennedy ignores. Section 5 is directed at changes which have both the
purpose and effect of creating a disparate impact on minority voting rights.
Justice Kennedy fails to address what remedy is appropriate for minority
voters when a transfer of authority made in good faith nevertheless has a
significant adverse impact on the ability of a minority representative to
represent his constituents. There is no "alternative remedial scheme" under
which such a decision could be challenged, and Section 5 would seem to
provide minority voters with the best protection in such circumstances.

227. THERNSTROM, supranote 10, at 16.
228. Id. at 832 ("If federalism is to operate as a practical system of governance and not a
mere poetic ideal, the States must be allowed both predictability and efficiency in structuring
their governments").
229. For an interesting discussion of the implementation of the Voting Rights Act, see
BALL, ET. AL., supra note 13, at 64-91.
230. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (emphasis added).
231. Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 831.
232. See supranotes 210-13 and accompanying text.
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F. Deference to the Justice Department
Justice Kennedy asserts that, in this case, the Justice Department is not
entitled to deference in its interpretation of what constitutes a "change with
respect to voting" because the Department's interpretation is unreasonable.
However, there is some confusion in the logic which Justice Kennedy uses to
arrive at this conclusion. He starts by acknowledging that there is ambiguity
as to what constitutes a change with respect to voting, and that this requires
interpretation to fill in "the gap." 3 He then asserts that Section 5 was not
intended to encompass changes that were not changes with respect to
voting."4 Therefore, he concludes, the Justice Department was not entitled
to deference, because the Department was preoccupied with a change which
was clearly not a change with respect to voting.235 Justice Kennedy thus
disposes of the question of ambiguity with this conclusory statement. Perhaps
he intended that the paragraph where he makes this argument" 6 should be
read in light of the whole opinion. Even so, the opinion nowhere acknowledges that a change in the decision-making authority of elected officials can
plausibly be interpreted as a "change with respect to voting" and that the
Justice Department is legitimately "filling in the gap" by its construction of the
statute.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Court characterizesthe instant decision blandly as one about the level
of federal intrusion that can be tolerated in the routine administrative
operations of an elected body. 7 But this distorts the importance of the
interests at stake. The decisions of local government officials have great
impact on the quality of lives of people living in these localities. Such
decisions can influence in a very intimate way the educational opportunities
a minority child may have, the kind of housing and health care opportunities
that minority families may have access to, and the kind of development
projects that are brought to neighborhoods. The distribution of public goods
turn crucially on decisions at these local levels.
The decision in Presley will embolden local officials in covered
jurisdictions to dilute the effects of successful litigation in prior Section 5

233.
234.
235.
236.

Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 832.
Id. at 831-32.
Id. at 831.
Id. at 831-32.
237. Id. at 829. According to Justice Kennedy, "[i]nnumerable state and local enactments
having nothing to do with voting affect the power of elected officials.... Yet no one would
contend that when Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act it meant to subject all or even most
decisions of government in covered jurisdictions to federal supervision." Id.
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cases. This result is a significant setback for minority voting rights. By
focusing on line-drawing problems, the Court ignores the overarching aim of
the Voting Rights Act: to give an effective voice to minority voters.
AISHA GINWALLA
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